This paper introduces systems of exchange values as tools for the organization of multi-agent systems. Systems of exchange values are defined on the basis of the theory of social exchanges, developed by Piaget and Homans. A model of social organization is proposed, where social relations are construed as social exchanges and exchange values are put into use in the support of the continuity of the performance of social exchanges. The dynamics of social organizations is formulated in terms of the regulation of exchanges of values, so that social equilibrium is connected to the continuity of the interactions. The concept of supervisor of social equilibrium is introduced as a centralized mechanism for solving the problem of the equilibrium of the organization The equilibrium supervisor solves such problem making use of a qualitative Markov Decision Process that uses numerical intervals for the representation of exchange values.
-vI is the value of the credit that acquires from for having realized the service for . Investment values are always negative, while the other values may be either positive or negative.
In stages of the type II , asks the payment for the service he did previously for , and the values related with this exchange stage -vII , tII , rII and sIIhave similar meaning. rI , sI , rII and sII are called material values. tI , vI , tII and vII are the virtual values. The order in which the exchange stages may occur is not necessarily I II . Piaget's modelling of social exchanges has an algebraic flavor, aiming at the formalization of algebraic laws for the operations involved in those exchanges, laws that serve as the bases for formalization of the rules that determine the equilibrium of exchanges:
Rule I :(rI = sI ) (sI = tI ) (tI = vI )
Rule II : (vII = tII ) (tII = rII ) (rII = sII ) Rule I II : vI = vII .
Rule I states the conditions for the internal equilibrium of stage I , implying that the investment made by in the performance of the service for equals the credit that assigns to , that is
Rule I .rI = vI
Rule II states the conditions for the internal equilibrium of stage II , implying that the credit charged by on equals the satisfaction gets from the return service performed by ,thatis
Rule II vII = sII .
Rule I II states the conditions for the external equilibrium between the two stages, I and II , implying that the initial investment made by equals the final satisfaction it gets from the interaction with , that is
Rule I II
. rI = sII
The equilibrium rules play a central role in Piaget's explication of the dynamics of the social organization and in the identification of situations of disequilibrium (including several kinds of social crises).
The development of certain moral rules, for instance, is associated to the equilibrium rules, for such moral rules are developed precisely for the sake of guaranteeing the validity of the equilibrium rules, through the enforcement of certain behaviors that can compensate behaviors which are prone to produce (or, that may have produced) a situation of disequilibrium.
The main role of the equilibrium supervisor introduced in this paper is precisely that of indicating what behaviors should be performed at each moment, by the agents, so as to compensate extant deviations from the state of equilibrium of exchange values.
Homans' Theory of Elementary Social Behaviors
Homans approached the subject of social exchanges (that he called elementary social behaviors) from a different point of view [20] : he was interested in explaining why each agent behave the way he does, in such exchanges. Being a sociologist, Homans borrowed from Skinner the theory of operant conditioning, as a means to explain why men continue to behave in certain ways (or, change behaviors), in certain situations.
Homans looked at the exchanges values when he looked for a sufficient stimulus for continued (or, discontinued) social behavior, and found it in the concept of profit, defined as profit= benefit cost, where benefit and cost are defined almost exactly as in Piaget's theory. Profit, in this qualitative sense, is seen as the element that can play the role of stimulus: bigger profit means stronger stimulus to continue the current behavior, while smaller profit means stronger stimulus to discontinue the current behavior.
Of course, search for profit maximization was known, to Homans, not to lead necessarily to the best overall results for the partners of an interaction, specially when looked from the point of view of social equilibrium, as Pareto had shown much earlier 5 .So, Homans had to extend Skinner's conceptions of human behavior with notions that are essentially nonbehavioristic (such as the notion of personal integrity before a group [19] ) in order to produce consistent explanations.
Homans' proposal gave the starting point for the formalization we present below, where the process of socia control that regulates an interaction (which in Homans' theory results from the combination of the various individual behaviors involved in the interaction) is reduced to a Markov Decision Problem [37] , to be solved by a central equilibrium supervisor.
The Role That Homans' Theory May Have in Piaget's Framework
The striking similarity between the basic concepts of the two theories, by Homans and Piaget, regarding the idea that a society is based on an organization where the relationships between individuals are conceived as valued exchanges, puts the question about the possible ways the two theories can be made closer to each other.
From our point of view, the way the two theories can be combined is based on the following observations. On the one hand, in the theory of the psychologist Piaget, the psychological aspects of social interactions were kept out of the formalization of social exchanges, to allow for a qualitative algebraic form. The price Piaget paid for that is that the theory had to give up producing a description of the decision processes that the individuals adopt while interacting, that is, to give up explaining the individuals' behaviors.
On the other hand, in the theory of the sociologist Homans, the psychological aspect of social interactions was brought to the foreground, in order to produce a description of the decision processes adopted by the interacting individuals, and an explanation of their behaviors. The behavioristic basis of the adopted psychological explanation, however, forced two consequences. First, the exchange values that could be taken into account were restricted to those of a quantitative nature, so that the notion of profit could be introduced, as a measurable and comparable difference between benefits and costs. Second, the psychological theory itself had to be extended in non-behavioristic directions, in order to accommodate subjective phenomena not directly observable, but essential for the explanation of moral behaviors.
The very constructions of the two approaches, thus, already indicate the way they may be combined: Piaget's theory can be used to formalize an explanation of social exchanges where the agents are understood algebraically, on the basis of the operations they use to handle the exchange values, while Homans' theory can be adapted to deal with the piagetian algebra of qualitative values, in order to formalize the internal decision processes that agents follow when deciding on the keeping or changing of their social behaviors.
In this paper, we present a first step in that direction. We don't show agents making decisions on the basis of their own idiosyncratic criteria, but we show a simplified version of the problem, where all agents are assumed to uniformly follow the same set of criteria when deciding what exchanges to propose to another agent, but where each agent is allowed to answer to that proposal in its own manner.
Halving the complexity of the problem in this way, we were able to perform the first, provisory stage in the formalization of the proposed integration of the two sociological theories that were taken as our bases of our work. The next step in the evolution of this synthesis, accounting for the agents' individual decision making with respect to exchange values, is briefly considered in the Conclusion of the paper.
Social Organizations
In this section, we build on previous work on the dynamics of multi-agent organizations [4, 5, 6, 7, 3, 13] in order to coordinate the notions of organization and exchange values, so that systems of exchange values can become useful tools for the organization of multiagent systems.
The central concept introduced here is that of dynamics of exchange values in social organizations.
The Notion of Social Organization
The notion of organization is not univocal. There are at least two main senses in which it is used, namely, a functional sense and a structural sense. In the functional sense, organization is one of the functional in variants that characterize all forms of autonomous dynamic systems [28] . In the structural sense, the organization of an autonomous dynamic system is the relational structure that allows the system's components to interact with each other. In this paper, we use the term organization in the latter, structural sense.
In its simplest form, the organization of a society have in order to perform such functions in an adequate way; social roles are the gluing elements of an organization;
-exchange values are the means by which the services that an agent performs are evaluated by the members of the society (including the agent itself and the other agents involved in the exchange), so S, at a given time t, is conceived as a structure OtS = that a resulting balance of exchange values can be (AtS) where Ais the set of agents of the society at tS, EtS used by social rules (see below) to compensate behaviors that deviate the society from the desired time t,and EtS is the set of social exchanges tS tS A A that are happening at that time 6 . In the following, we will only consider the static (synchronic) case, where the organization of a society is not changing while the society is functioning. So, we will let implicit the time kind of balance (equilibrated, disequilibrated);
-social rulesare the means by which agents (given the social functions that are to be performed in the society, and the way the social roles were as index t. Also, since we will consider one single society, we will let implicit the index S. signed to the agents) are obliged to behave in certain ways, and forbidden to behave in some other ways.
Social Functions, Social Roles, Exchange Values, and Social Rules
Implicit in the structural conception of organization is, thus, a dynamical notion of social equilibrium(or, disequilibrium), which -in this paper -we restrict to the notion of equilibrium (or, disequilibrium) ofsocial exchanges, as defined by Piaget.
Definition of Social Organization
For the purposes of this paper, the notion of social organization can be defined as: -the set IBeh of all possible individual behaviorsof all agents of the society, so that to each agent corresponds the set of individual behaviors that it is capable of realizing, given by IB : A IBeh; Societies with the simple form defined above should have a big problem to keep their existence in time: the only permanent element they have are the agents, since exchanges are usually finite, and vanish suddenly. Agents, in such situations, are thus allowed to interact with any other agents in the society, at any time, as they are pleased, or simply not to interact at all. Organization, in such societies, is no more than a set of momentary exchanges. There is no way organization can become a structural invariant of the society, in a society with such a simple form.
Many other permanent elements are required, in the organization of a society, if the society is to be able to keep its organization reasonably stable during a certain period. We identify four main notions allowing for such invariant organization, namely, social functions, social roles, exchange values,and social rules:
-social functions are the services that agents (or, sets of agents), perform for other agents (or, sets of agents) in the society, and that justify the very existence of the society: agents that are selfsufficient need not live in societies; only agents that have the need that others perform certain services for them care to live together with others;
-social rolesare the relational elements that establish the links between the agents, the social functions they perform, and the behavior they should -the way the set E of all possible social exchanges are related to the subset of agents that are capable of realizing them together, given by Cap : (A) E;
-the way each social function is implemented by a set of agents in the form of a social exchange, given by I :
-the way each social role determines the individual behavior of the agent to which it is assigned, regarding the performance of a social function, given by the function P : F Ro IBeh;
-the way each agent evaluates the performance of an exchange, given by the function Ev : E A BV -the way each social rule determines the permitted, obligatory and forbidden behaviors of agents in a social exchange, according to the balance of exchange values assigned to the social exchange, regarding the performance of a social function, given by Ru :
The detailed exploration of the connections among the main and complementary elements of a social organization, as defined above, are out of the scope of this paper. We concentrate just on the connections that allow the understanding of our notion of dynamics of exchange values, leading to the concept of exchange value-based social control, and its provisory centralized form, the supervisor of social equilibrium.
The Dynamics of Exchange Values
Although Piaget, in his sociological works, did not develop his notion of dynamics of an organization, both in his works on the Epistemology of Biology [28] and in his psychological works on the equilibration of cognitive structures [29] , that notion is well exposed. We summarize here that piagetian cybernetics,concentrating just in the concepts that directly apply to our problem.
In any dynamical system where a notion of equilibrium can be defined, two related concepts immediately apply, namely, the concepts of deviation and compensation.
Deviation is any action that may happen in a system and lead it to disequilibrium, that is, away from equilibrium. Compensation is any action that may happen in a system, when it is in disequilibrium, and lead it back to equilibrium.
Regulation is the process of determining which compensation should be performed, at a given moment, to compensate a deviation, when the system is in disequilibrium. In Homan's terms [19] , Piaget's process of regulation is a social control process that aims to keep the society stable in a state of equilibrium.
Piaget applies such ideas both to the synchronic regulation of a system's functioning (where the structure of the system is kept essentially unchanged) and to the diachronic regulation of the development of the system's structural organization, when the system is in a process of development. To the first, he assigned the name minor equilibration, while the latter he called major equilibration. In our case, we focus on the synchronic functioning of a social system, so that only minor equilibrations will be considered. We consider social systems where the interactions are seen as exchanges of services, and whose equilibrium is defined on the basis of balances of values associated to such exchanges. In such systems, deviations are actions (performances of services) whose evaluations lead the system to a state where the balances of exchange values are such that at least one of the equilibrium rules I ,II and I II is not satisfied. A compensation is a performance of a service that may lead the system back to a state where the balances of exchange values are such that those rules are satisfied.
Social rulesspecify a mechanism of social control by stipulating that, for each state of disequilibrium, the kind of action that should be performed in order to re-establish the equilibrium of the system. Two kinds of such actions are possible: punishment and reciprocation. Punishment is an action by which an individual suffers some lost in order to be reinforced towards not repeating the deviation action again.
Reciprocation is an action by which an individual is forced to perform a service for the other, in order to compensate him for some service the latter had previously performed for him. Reciprocation is the fundamental operation of compensation, in Piaget's model of regulation of social exchanges.
Of course, everything that has been said here in connection to social control processes that aim to stabilize the society or organization in a state of equilibrium, also applies to social control processes that aim to keep the society or organization stable in a state of disequilibrium 8 .
Supervisors of Social Equilibrium
In general, such exchange values-based mechanism of social controlmay be put to operate in two main ways. On the one hand, social rules may be enforced by authorities, which have the capacity to push the agents of the society to follow such rules.
On the other hand, social rules may be internalized by the agents, so that agents follow such rules because they are incorporated into the agents' behaviors.
Typical of the social rules enforced by authorities are the juridicalrules of a society (laws, statutes, organizational norms), dealing with rights and duties. Typical of the internalized rules are the moral rules, dealing with permissions and obligations.
In the following, as a preparatory step to a future study of decentralized social control mechanisms based on social rules internalized in agents, we introduce a centralized version of such mechanism. We consider the notion of supervisor of social equilibrium, a component of the society (possibly an agent) that is able to determine, at each time, the set of compensation actions that may be performed in order to bring the social system back to the equilibrium (or, disequilibrium), regarding the balances of exchange values, and that may recommend some of such actions to the agents of the system, in order to get that equilibrium (or, disequilibrium).
Obviously, supervisors of social equilibrium do not implement moral rules, because moral rules, in the sense defined above, can only be implemented inside the agents themselves, not in a component of the society that is external to them.
So, supervisors of social equilibrium implement juridical rules (laws, norms). However, they do so in a way that they are not law enforcers, because we don't require that agents follow the recommendations: agents are allowed to autonomously decide if they are to follow, or not, any given recommendation. 
A Model Supervisor of Social Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce a formal model for a supervisor of social equilibrium, which is able to implement a regulation process for the equilibration (or, disequilibration) of exchange values.
The regulation process is embedded in the equilibrium supervisor in the form of a recommendation policy, which determines for each kind of exchange values state an appropriate compensation action.
However, we don't consider here the connection between the recommendation policy that implements the regulation process, and the expression of such regulation process in the form of juridical rules. That is, everything works in the model as if the juridical rules were pre-compiled into its recommendation policy, by way of the reward function of the Markov Decision Process solved by the equilibrium supervisor.
Further work is necessary on this compilation process both to understand the connection between the language of juridical laws and its translation in terms of exchange values, and to allow for a dynamic compilation process, capable of supporting dynamic changes in juridical laws, in order to model organizations supporting evolutive juridical systems.
Using Interval Mathematics for Representing Social Values
Interval Mathematicsis a mathematical theory introduced in the 1960's by Moore [26] that aims at the automatic and rigorous control of the errors that arise in numerical computations. Any real number x Ris represented by a real interval X =[x1,x2], with x1,x2 R, such that x1 x x2. x1and x2denote, respectively, the left and right endpoints of a real interval X. The set of real intervals is denoted by IR.
The arithmetical operations IR {+, , ÷} are defined on IRas X IRY = {x y | x X,y Y} 9 , and they can be explicitly calculated by [27] : A machine interval has floating point numbers as endpoints and outward roundings are used to guarantee that the resulting output interval of any interval computation process contains the actual result [17] . Besides that, the range of the output interval is the indicative of the maximum error that may have occurred in the whole process.
Interval Mathematics has also been applied to represent other kinds of uncertainty rather than numerical uncertainty [16] , with applications in Artificial Intelligence, Soft Computing etc.
In this paper, intervals are used to capture the qualitative nature of Piaget's concept of scale of exchange values [31] . The chosen representation is a compromise between a purely qualitative and a purely quantitative representation. It makes the representation mathematically operational, and the decision process computationally viable, without being unfaithful to Piaget's approach. -A quasi-symmetric value of X IRL is any interval X IRL such that X + X . The set of quasi-symmetric values of X is denoted by X.
X is said to be the least quasi-symmetric value of X if whenever there exists S X it holds that d( X) d(S), where d(X)= x2 x1is the diameter of X. For all X IRL, it follows that:
Proof. It holds that mid(X
X such that mid(S) For k1= k2 R, it follows that mid( In practical applications, due to the rounding errors that arise in any numerical computation, it is usually not possible to verify wether or not a computed interval is 
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The Modelling of Social Exchanges
Let T be a set of discrete instants of time. Let and be any two agents. A qualitative interval exchange-value system for modelling the exchanges from to is a structure IR = (IRL (2) and (3), at a given time instant t, the following constraints must be satisfied for every pair of agents and :
II II II t r
where:
-r t = denotes that the agent did not perform a service for the agent at time t, and, therefore, all the other corresponding exchange values in the stage I resulted undefined; -v t = denotes that the agent , at time t,did not charge the credit for a service previously done for the agent , and, therefore, all the other corresponding exchange values in the stage II resulted undefined.
The implication (6) means that, according to the structure of social exchanges (Fig. 1) , it is not possible for an agent to perform a service for and, at the same time t, to charge him a credit. From (6) it follows that it is also required that v
A configuration of exchange valuesfor any pair of agents and at a time instant t is specified by one of the tuples of well defined exchange values: The general results take into account all kinds of exchanges values, and is obtained by:
A social exchange process between a pair of agents and is said to be in equilibrium(with tolerance 0) if TT g and g . The material equilibrium is achieved when TT m and m .
Modelling Social Exchanges Involving Multiple Agents
In this section, a matrix-like notation is introduced to make possible the generalization of the results concerning the social exchanges between two agents, presented in Sect. -Any -matrix [nij ] such that nij is an -null-matrix. The set of such -matrices is denoted by N.
-The qualitative equivalence relation(module
In a multi-agent system composed by m agents, the exchange values determined by the functions defined in (2) and (3) The exchange balance of stages of type I, given in (7), is represented by a tuple of -matrices: For example, consider the case of a society with just two agents and . For the pair of classes of material results (using the notation given in (13)) it follows that the compensation-compensationaction C i ,C j and the go-backward 3-go-forward+2 respectively, resulting in the following state transitions, with n i< 1 and 1 <j n.
The equilibrium supervisor has to find, for each state [E i ], the action that shall achieve the terminal state or, at least, another state from where the terminal state can be achieved, with the least number of steps and least final valueuncertainty 12 . We observe that the choice of such actions are also regulated by the rules of the social exchanges, and, therefore, there are some state transitions that are not allowed.
Based on a optimal policy, the equilibrium supervisor may be asked to recommend that the agents act optimally. An optimal exchange recommendation consists of a function that gives, for each actual material result (represented by a state of the model), a partially defined exchange stage that shall restore or establish the material equilibrium or, at least, give conditions that it be achieved in a least number of steps with least value uncertainty. This partial definition shall be completed by the analysis of the virtual results, which allows the specification of which particulary types of exchange stages (I or II) should be considered.
Although the interacting agents acknowledge the optimal recommendations from the equilibrium supervisor, they are autonomous in the sense that they may not follow the recommendations exactly. The agents may have different personalities, interests, needs etc., which may lead them not to always follow the recommendations. This means that there is a probability that the system achieves another state different from the suggested by the supervisor and, therefore, there may be a great deal of uncertainty about the effects of the agents actions.
Even if the agents follow a recommendation exactly, we will show that the effect may not be the expected by the supervisor, since it depends on the ratio , L where n = n is the equilibrium supervisor accuracy and R(0 < n) is the admissible tolerance. On the other hand, in this paper, we assume that there is never any Systems of Exchange Values as Tools for Multi-Agent Organiza... file:///Users/gabi/Biblioteca%20Digital%20SBC/Vol.11%20Nr...
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2/4/09 8:00 PM uncertainty about the current state of the system, that is, the equilibrium supervisor always has access to the current configuration of exchange values and has complete and perfect abilities to evaluate the current material balance.
Definition 2 AQualitative Interval Markov Decision Process (QI-MDP),for keeping in equilibrium the social exchanges in a multi-agent systems of magents, is a tuple E, A, F, R L,n
,where this model, the next state and the expected reward depend only on the previous state and the action taken, satisfying the so-called Markovproperty.
The Optimal Policy and the Reward Function
The reward function plays an important role when the equilibrium supervisor is choosing the action that will generate a recommendation of agents interaction, in each state. The supervisor aims to maximize the utility of sequences of actions, evaluated according to the reward function, thus trying to bring the system back to equilibrium (or keep it there) with the least possible number of state transitions.
A sample reward function R :(E A) Rthat conforms to the idea of supporting a recommendation function that is able to direct pairs of agents into social equilibrium is partially sketched in Table 3 , using the notation given in (13) . This particular sample function illustrates various requirements that should be satisfied by any reward function of the model.
Observe, for instance, that if the current state is of thetype(E ,E + ), then the best action to be chosen is the compensation-compensationaction (C, C) , which results in a state transition (E ,E + )
. Any other choice should make the agents either take a long way to the equilibrium or get away from it.
On the other hand, if the current state is of type (E ,E ), then a compensation-compensation action (C, C) would generate a recommendation of agent exchanges of satisfaction-satisfactiontype, which is impossible according to the model of social interactions [33] , since it is impossible for an agent to get a satisfaction value from no service at all. The reward function R should state that (C,C) is a very bad action to be chosen in such situation.
Any optimal policy : E A solving the social equilibrium problem should satisfy the set of requirements expressed by the schema partially sketched in Table 4 (for a pair of agents). Notice that it is a non deterministic policy.
The optimal value recommendation associated to an optimal policy is a -matrix operator that gives, for each state E The optimal value recommendation , corresponding to the the optimal policy shown in Table 4 , is partially sketched in Table 5 .
Finally, the equilibrium supervisor has to decide which types of exchange stages (I or II) should be recommended. This is done by the analysis of the virtual results from the points of view of each pair of agents (given in (10)) and (given in (11)):
-If v > 0, then is able to charge the credit for services previously done. Thus, an exchange stage of type II should be recommended.
-If v > 0, then it is the case that the agent can charge the credit for services previously done, indicating that an exchange stage of type II should then be recommended.
-If v 0, then the agent does not have any credit to charge . Therefore, the service done by must be spontaneous. In this case, an exchange stage of type I should then be recommended.
-If v 0, then the agent does not have any credit to charge , resulting that an exchange stage of type I should then be chosen. Table 6 shows the criteria used by the equilibrium supervisor to reason about the possible stagerecommendations, based on virtual results, according to the discussion presented in the paragraph above. Observe that these alternatives are not mutually exclusive. The final decision of which type of exchange stage shall be executed is let to the agents to decide. 
The stage effects of the recommendations (Table 6 ) are sketched in the simplified state transition diagram shown in Fig. 2 . The dot lines represent alternative paths to the equilibrium state that were not considered as optimal recommendations since they are considered impossible according to the structure of the exchange stages. The symbol of the -matrices was omitted.
Analysis of the Model
For the analysis of the model, we consider a multiagent organization whose agents are classified by the degree in which they follow the recommendations given by the equilibrium supervisor. The obedient agent always follows the recommendations; the disobedient agent may not follow the recommendations.
The symbol in the notation of the -matrices was omitted.
Consider a multi-agent system composed by just where L = h, with h> 1. If the system achieves two obedient agents and and use the notation the equilibrium in the step 1, then it holds that given in (13) . Let M =(m be the ma-2 (h ) . It follows that 1 <h 3, and 
Proof. (i)( ) Considering that (i 1)
L n ( Table 5 , R11) is based on the optimal action. The symbol in the notation of the -matrices was omitted.
any service at all) are not allowed. In this case, the optimal recommendation (Table 5 ) leads the agents to get the material equilibrium in at most four steps, by one of the following transitions.
Simulation Results
Simulations of supervised social exchange processes were developed in the Python programming language, generating two types of reports: tables with the configurations of exchange values and material results at each time t T =0,...,1000, and graphics showing the trajectory of the mid points of the material results of the exchanges between two agents of a (simulated) system. The material and virtual values that agents could use at each exchange stage were set to vary in the range 100 ...+ 100. A tolerance of [ ,] = [ 25, 25] was adopted for the definition of the equilibrium point.
First, we considered simulations of social exchanges processes in organizations where the supervisor was inactive, Fig. 3 Then we awaked up the supervisor and let it make recommendations, which the agents followed or not, according to their degree of obedience to the supervi sor. In successive experiments, we increased the percentage of agent obedience to the supervisor, generating five different simulations: obedience during 1% of the time (Fig.4 , exchange values bound to L = 1400), obedience during 25% of the time (Fig. 5 , exchange values Time bound to L = 700), obedience during 50% of the time (Fig. 6 , exchange values bound to L = 350), obedience during 75% of the time (Fig. 7 , exchange values profited from the interaction much more than ,which was forced to keep its material results at a negative level for the most part of the experiment. Considering the given tolerance, one finds that the system starts in equilibrium, but was unable to keep it. Figure 4 shows a 1% supervised exchange processes.
enough to make the two agents alternate their kinds of behaviors during the exchanges, thus avoiding that
The figure shows that just such level of supervision is one of them profits from the interaction at the expense of the other. Also, the system was able to achieve the equilibrium in various opportunities (e.g., at t = 196 and at t = 893), but was kept yet in disequilibrium The simple simulations that we produced seem to confirm well the theoretical predictions that we could derive from the supervisor model in section 5.1.
Conclusion
This paper introduced the QI-MDP version of the Markov Decision Process. The combination of interval-based modelling and qualitative approach to the comparison of values of the model made it well suited for solving the problem of keeping social exchanges in equilibrium.
From the point of view of Piaget's theory of social Figure 8 : Agent obedience in 100% of the time interactions, it means a sound way of making practical use of the INRC group of social exchanges that structure the social interactions and defines its equilibrium problem [9, 10] .
The QI-MDP model is general enough to be applied to other problems, besides the problem of keeping social interactions in equilibrium. It can be adapted to model situations in which the social interactions should be kept stable, but in disequilibrium. This can be done by choosing a non null terminal state for the supervisor.
The model can also be applied to equilibrium problems of other kinds of systems, besides systems of social exchanges, if such systems have one single terminal (equilibrated, disequilibrated) state.
Regarding the notion of socialcontrolintroduced in [23] , and explored in [12] in connection to multiagent systems, the social rules concerned with exchange values introduce the notion of exchangevaluesbasedsocialcontrol, first analyzed in [19] . Thus, the present paper can be seen as a preliminary step in the computational formalization of such notion.
Immediate future work will be concerned with the case of an equilibrium supervisor that is not able to determine the material balance of social exchange processes with complete reliability (i.e., it is not allowed to know all the exchange values of the two agents). In this case, a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) shall be considered (see, p.ex., [15] ), since the equilibrium supervisor shall be able to make external observations (also probabilistic) to help him to decide about the recommendations.
Further future works will deal with (i) the internalization of the model decision process introduced in the paper, in each agent of the organization, so that the mechanism of exchange values-based social control that it supports can be performed in a decentralized way, and (ii) further exploration of the role of exchange values in dependence-based agent interactions.
applications. 8 See [12] for a discussion of the role of social control processes in artificial societies. 9 Whenever it can be understood from the context, we shall not use the notation IRto distinguish interval operations. 10 The values are undefined if no service is done at all at a given moment t T . 
